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Abstract—Over the past decade, security researchers and 
practitioners have tried to understand why employees do not 
comply with organizational security policies and mechanisms. 
Past research has treated compliance as a binary decision: people 
comply, or they do not.  From our analysis of 118 in-depth inter-
views with individuals (employees in a large multinational organ-
ization) about security non-compliance, a 3rd response emerges: 
shadow security. This describes the instances where security-
conscious employees who think they cannot comply with the 
prescribed security policy create a more fitting alternative to the 
policies and mechanisms created by the organization’s official 
security staff.  These workarounds are usually not visible to offi-
cial security and higher management – hence ‘shadow security’. 
They may not be as secure as the ‘official’ policy would be in 
theory, but they reflect the best compromise staff can find be-
tween getting the job done and managing the risks that the assets 
they understand face.  We conclude that rather than trying to 
‘stamp out’ shadow security practices, organizations should learn 
from them: they provide a starting point ‘workable’ security:  
solutions that offer effective security and fit with the organiza-
tion’s business, rather than impede it.  
Keywords — Information security management; compliance; 
security design 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Information Security has traditionally been implemented 
through policies and technical solutions.  It was seen as reason-
able to secure systems with policies that dictate what users can 
and cannot do, and technical mechanisms that enforce this [1].  
As IT progressively supports more and more activities within 
the working environment, this approach becomes problematic 
because policies and mechanisms demand too much effort, and 
when the effort becomes unreasonable, humans make mistakes 
or cease to comply [2][3].  Human error and social engineering 
can be bigger vulnerabilities than many technical attacks [4].  
The organization's technical systems must be fortified, yet 
effective security management needs to consider the physical 
and social environment in which those technical implementa-
tions are used [5][6].   
This new environment pushes responsibility for protecting 
the organization beyond its information security experts: em-
ployees - the users of organizational IT systems - play a key 
role in delivering the policy.  Security experts in organizations 
usually work together in a central function and try to create and 
maintain a shared sense of appropriate security behavior 
through policies. They attribute employee non-compliance to 
lack of understanding. Thus, when non-compliance is detected, 
they respond with security education campaigns, which exhort 
users to comply with proscribed security mechanisms and pro-
cesses.  But the truth is that almost no organization evaluated 
whether these policies and mechanisms were fit-for-purpose in 
the real working environment [7].  In addition, the increasing 
complexity of the threat makes it difficult to anticipate, define 
and communicate all desired policy-compliant behaviors for all 
potential exceptions and circumstances [8].  Thus, the tradi-
tional, centralized “command and control” approach to security 
becomes impossible [9], and we need to rethink of the way 
information security is implemented and managed.  We know 
that an employee's choice as to whether to comply with securi-
ty policies is influenced by his/her own task goals, perceptions, 
attitudes and norms [2][10].  Security design should 
acknowledge this and develop an approach for a “middle 
ground” solution that balances employee and security experts’ 
priorities [11]. 
We suggest that this is where understanding "shadow secu-
rity"1 can help: understanding the security practices outside the 
jurisdiction of the organization, developed by employees who 
do not willfully disregard security.  When security experts 
insist on ‘standard’ or ‘best practice policies’, these users are 
left to procure, deploy and refine their own solutions, outside 
the control of the organization's designated security manage-
ment.  
In this paper we present an organizational case study of 
shadow security behaviors. We analyzed 118 interviews with 
employees in a large multi-national organization, in which they 
discussed their security practices.  We outline how understand-
ing their practices can improve the process of deploying and 
refining security in the organization, involving users in the 
process of evolving security. We argue this is a plausible route 
to achieving productivity-enhancing, rather than productivity-
                                                          
1 Shadow IT is defined as: “employees going around IT to get the IT services 
they want on their own” [12] 
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hampering information security; a key requirement for getting 
users involved in shaping the security environment around 
them is the creation of feedback channels to security profes-
sionals.  
II. CURRENT STATE OF INFORMATION SECURITY IN 
ORGANIZATIONS 
A. Mechanisms, Policies and Communication  
To effectively reduce their exposure to security risks, or-
ganizations formulate security policies, and implement them 
through technical mechanisms (e.g. access control, authentica-
tion and authorization mechanisms).   Based on regulations and 
international standards (e.g. ISO27000 series) organizations 
write security policies to communicate security goals to em-
ployees, and implement technical mechanisms to enforce be-
haviors considered necessary to meet those goals.  Policies 
usually reside on an organization’s intranet, define the security 
objectives of the organization, responsibilities of employees 
and expected behaviors and sanctions in case of non-
compliance.  Policy content is communicated to employees via 
leaflets (often given on the 1st day at work) and/or security 
awareness and education campaigns.   This approach may seem 
plausible, but evidence of widespread non-compliance (from 
research studies and analysis of security breaches) suggests it is 
not effective:   
1) It’s Impossible to Comply with Policies and Get Work 
Done: security mechanisms that are impossible or difficult to 
use sap employee resources and reduce organizational produc-
tivity [13].  Security experts focus on security and attribute 
non-compliance to user ignorance or willful disobedience [7].  
Failure to consider the requirements of the business process, 
the context and the environment in which human-technology 
interaction takes place means that, in practice, security gets in 
the way [13]: all compliance scenarios are essentially treated as 
the same, regardless of employee role, the sensitivity of infor-
mation that individuals deal with, or the variance in threat envi-
ronment as employees move across locations (e.g. home work-
er, office worker, field worker) [14]. 
2) Current Policies are Irrelevant and Burdensome: In-
formation security policies are supposed to provide employees 
with a clear understanding of security objectives and responsi-
bilities [15].  Despite their importance as a tool that defines the 
security expectations of the organization, the current approach 
to information security policy formulation and communication 
is mostly reactive, driven by past failures.  This concentrates 
security on protecting the organization from breaches closely 
resembling prior threats, which can be dangerous in a fast-
changing environment where new threats appear day-to-day 
[11].  There is no systematic approach to make sure policies do 
not contradict each other, nor is effectiveness of policies evalu-
ated [16]. 
B. Enactment 
When mechanisms and policies do not lead to the desired 
security behavior security experts respond in two ways: Disci-
pline or persuasion: 
1) The Hard Approach – Discipline: In theory, breach of 
security policy is punished with warnings and sanctions. But 
given the widespread use, monitoring to detect breach of policy 
is expensive.  And given that non-compliance is widespread, an 
unmanageably large number of employees would have to be 
disciplined [9].  Sanctions that are not enforced are not an 
effective deterrent, and heavy-handed  enforcement increases 
tension between security enforcers and the rest of the 
organization – the scenario first described in “Users Are Not 
the Enemy” [7].   
2) The Soft Approach - Persuasion: responding to non-
compliance with security awareness (of the risks) and training 
(of correct behavior) can potentially influence employee 
behavior towards compliance. But if polcies and mechanisms 
are burdensome and get in the way of productive activity, these 
attempts are just perceived as ‘more time wasted by security’ 
[3].  The associated frustration creates a negative attitude to 
information security, resulting in any and all communication to 
be discredited, and discouraging compliance even with 
mechanisms that  do not create high friction – because ‘it all 
adds up’[5][20]. 
The insight that both current routes do not work ought to 
focus organization’s attention on the root of the problem: that 
non-compliance springs from the friction between security and 
productive activity.  Employees have no other way to respond 
to security that gets in the way [8][9].  The workarounds we 
observed are employees’ only way to shaping a security envi-
ronment that they can work in.  The emerging negative attitude 
towards security, combined with the continuously increasing 
security risks organizations face [21][22], suggest a need to 
radically rethink the management of information security to 
provide effective protection to organizations. 
III. USING NON-COMPLIANCE TO GUIDE SECURITY DESIGN 
Past research on usable security mostly focused on devising 
principles to design new, bespoke software or systems to fit the 
requirements of specific work environments (e.g. [23][24]).  In 
addition, the only attempt we are aware of that aimed to char-
acterize security behaviors in the environment in which the 
interaction of end-users and security happens resulted in sug-
gestions that called for radical redesign of technological solu-
tions, including security from the start of the design process 
[11].  We have encountered many organizations where re-
placement is not an option, and have been asked to help them 
to evolve their security policies and mechanisms.  This moti-
vated us to develop a methodology to identify high-friction 
security and replace it with a solution that provides a better fit 
with individual and organizational business processes [25]. 
The first step towards creating such an approach is to iden-
tify current non-compliance instances in organizations, the 
factors that contribute to their occurrence and the employee 
responses that manifest.  Usable security research has touched 
on this in the past: Bartsch and Sasse [17] identified user re-
sponses to unusable access control setups and mechanisms, 
while Weirich [26] and Inglesant and Sasse [27] articulated the 
true impact of unusable password policies in organizations.  
Kirlappos et al. [9] provided a categorization of the various 
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factors that lead to employees adopting non-compliant behav-
iors: 
1. Lack of awareness: Employees unaware of security risks 
or policy content have no incentive to exhibit security-
conscious behavior. 
2. High compliance costs: Mechanisms or processes impact-
ing heavily upon productivity leave employees with no 
other option than non-compliance. 
3. Compliance impossible: Prescribed behavior could not be 
followed due to problematic mechanisms; employees re-
sorted to finding other ways to proceed with their primary 
task. 
This previous research has informed understanding how 
specific security policies and mechanisms for authentication 
and access control can be changed to fit with primary tasks.  
Here, we develop a detailed, empirically-founded understand-
ing of shadow security practices, and discuss how security 
experts can leverage these to develop secure and workable 
solutions in their organizations.   
IV. METHODOLOGY 
To understand how employees respond to unworkable se-
curity with shadow security practices, we analyzed a set of 
interviews conducted with employees of a large multinational 
organization.  The organization gave us access to their employ-
ees, and allowed us to explore employee interaction with - and 
sentiment toward - their current security policies and mecha-
nisms.  This allowed us to identify friction points between 
security and business processes within the organization that 
lead to non-compliant behaviors.  The interviews were semi-
structured and conducted one-to-one by a team of three re-
searchers (including one of the authors). Interviews with indi-
vidual employees lasted approximately 50 minutes each, allow-
ing for elicitation of a suitably rich representation of the em-
ployee experience of security.  Participants held various lower-
level and lower to middle management positions within a 
number of organizational divisions, including network mainte-
nance, customer service, marketing, administration, finance, 
procurement and IT and worked in either a US or UK location.  
Employees were recruited via the company email newsletter, 
sent to all company employees - the Chief Information Security 
Officer encouraged participation and assured that participants 
would not be identified or followed up. The first 120 respond-
ers were scheduled for interview in person or by phone.  Partic-
ipants were given a consent form that described how transcripts 
would be anonymized and only aggregated results reported to 
the organization; that they could ask the interviewer further 
questions about the process and terminate the interview at any 
point.  After the interview, participants were paid the equiva-
lent of $40. 
The structure of interviews touched upon aspects of securi-
ty awareness and compliance, including: 
a. What is the employee perception of how security impacts 
their role?  Are they aware of the potential sensitivity of 
the information they handle? 
b. What do employees appreciate in terms of organizational 
support for security?  Are they aware of the existence of 
security policies and those security mechanisms that they 
should or could use to protect information and reduce 
security risks? 
c. Where employees exercise non-compliance as a response 
to shortcomings or frictions in the organizational security 
experience, what conditions led to those behaviors 
divergent from organization policy? Are they still 
conscious about the need for security?  If so, what do they 
do about it? 
We did not encourage participants to tell us about security 
infractions, but simply asked about their awareness of, and 
experience with, a set of corporate security policies. 
Interviews were recorded and transcribed, and a Grounded 
Theory analysis [28] using open, axial and selective coding 
conducted, using Atlas Ti.  A preliminary thematic analysis by 
one of the authors produced the non-compliance categorization 
that is described in Section III and was previously published in 
Kirlappos et al. [9].  From this emerged that in many cases, 
employees were trying to act in a secure way even when they 
were not complying with policies.  We decided to conduct a 
further, more in-depth analysis of those responses.   
All three authors coded an initial set of ten interviews and a 
codebook and related categories were devised.  This was then 
used for the full analysis of all the interviews by one of the 
authors, which aimed to accurately understand the conditions 
that lead to the creation of shadow security in the organization.  
The results of this analysis are presented in the next section. 
V. RESULTS 
Our analysis identified narratives of employee security be-
haviors, how the organization environment contributes to non-
compliance, and how employees respond.  The Grounded The-
ory categories of non-compliance that emerged fell into four 
groups: (i) compliance drivers and capacity of employees to 
behave securely, (ii) shadow security emergence due to high 
security overheads, (iii) security mediation at team level and, 
(iv) existence of employee willingness to report security prob-
lems, which then appears to be ignored.  In this section we 
frame the emerged categories as narratives using interview 
extracts that include both friction causes (problem with securi-
ty mechanisms and processes) and the associated effect (em-
ployee response).  We also include a quantitative measure of 
the number of code occurrences related to each narrative, as 
identified in the analysis, which indicates the prevalence of the 
identified behaviors in the organizational environment that was 
investigated.   
A. Employee Compliance Drivers 
Contrary to the archetypal view held by security managers, 
employees appear sufficiently motivated to comply with secu-
rity and possess some individual capacity to do so effectively.  
All 118 participants showed awareness of the importance of the 
information they handle within their role, and the potential 
consequences of information leaks.  108 participants said they 
take active measures to protect such information.  For example: 
P24: “Some folks in my area have privileged access to custom-
er address information, usage information, that certainly other 
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industries and other entities that are interested in selling to our 
customers would have interest in acquiring and it’s part of our 
roles and responsibilities and ethics requirements that we do 
not release that information, either for someone else’s gain or 
for our own gain.”  
Fifty-six participants explicitly mentioned that the main driver 
for secure behavior was security communication (as we explain 
later this does not necessarily mean communication from the 
organization’s security enforcers): 
P86: “We’ve just been told not to mention it on social network-
ing sites, because of the critical importance and the kind of 
environment we live in now, it’s best not to share that kind of 
stuff.  It’s just company policy, that’s the way they want it.” 
For 15 participants security motivation existed even when they 
were not aware of an applicable clause in the security policy on 
the topic:  
P112: “I guess general like not leaving confidential infor-
mation around on your desks and bits and bobs like that really 
but I do not know any policies”.   
This suggests that, despite some understanding about the need 
for security being present amongst employees, the organization 
did not communicate relevant aspects of policy to them (in this 
case the ‘clear desk ‘policy).  It also suggests that individual 
employees try to compensate for perceived gaps in policy. 
We found some cases where the environment supported 
policy, and this had a positive compliance effect.  Nineteen 
participants mentioned that security “piggybacking” on other 
business processes or imposing minimal compliance cost had 
lead them to behave securely:  
P65: “the new wing has just been opened up that’ll be hot-
desks, you won’t be able to leave anything out. ‘Cause you 
won’t know tomorrow if you're going to sit at the same desk” 
 Individual secure behavior was increased by peers who 
encouraged secure behavior in others: 20 participants reported 
that the actions of colleagues - reminding others to comply, and 
actively responding to peers' insecure behavior - also acted as a 
driver for their own secure behavior: 
P95: “I have somebody on my team who likes to change the 
mouse buttons round and turn your screen upside down if you 
don’t, so you kind of get used to locking your screen when you 
leave your desk.” 
This willingness to proactively communicate the need to be 
secure and take action to remind colleagues about it was also 
present in one participant’s reports that they remind their man-
agers about the need to lock their screen: 
P116: “But my line manager was not until I insisted that he 
locked it.” 
There were also reports that past security incidents act as a 
reminder for company employees to behave securely.  Twenty-
one participants mentioned that their awareness of past security 
incidents affected their perception about the need for security:  
P61: “When I saw some of the recent security breaches, people 
losing disks and CDs and laptops, things like that.  It is some-
thing that I'm aware of and do try and minimize what's on 
there.”  
The above example again suggests there is concern for security 
and employee capacity to behave securely; it also suggests that 
employees are able to relate security consequences to personal 
practices, which can act as a motivator to improve their securi-
ty behavior.  
In general, employees appeared motivated to invest some 
proportion of their time to keep the organization secure.  They 
appeared willing to take action to address potential risks when 
insecure conditions or behaviors were identified (i.e., take care 
to protect information, behave securely when the overhead is 
minimal).  Individuals also encouraged their colleagues and 
superiors to behave securely, implying that if security enforcers 
manage to instill appropriate behaviors in employees, these can 
then be reinforced across the employee base.  In addition, the 
findings of this section reinforce past research reports that se-
curity mechanisms that imposed minimal additional workload 
have positive effect on employee compliance behaviors [2][9].   
B. Effects of Burdensome Security Implementations 
Despite recognition of the need to protect the organization 
and the resulting practices of secure behavior, some employees 
spoke of security as something that creates significant addi-
tional burden to them.  The perception of an excessive impact 
upon the ability to proceed with a business task lead to em-
ployees choosing to procure their own - less demanding and 
less disruptive -  solutions to support (what they believed to be 
more proportionate) security behavior.  In the majority of the 
examples we present here, participants appeared to recognize 
their chosen action as an insecure approach, but provided some 
reasoning to legitimize their behavior; either due to compliant 
behavior constituting an unreasonable draw upon their time, or 
compliance being regarded as simply impossible. The security 
burden was variously articulated in terms of time, cognitive 
load, organizational adaptability, and disruption.   
1) Time: Time-related problems occurred when employees 
found themselves in situations where enacting the prescribed 
security behavior resulted in slower completion of primary 
business processes (47 participants): 
P49: “You should use an encrypted one but, you know, for ease 
and generally because, I haven’t got an encrypted one so I just 
use an unencrypted one, whip it across and then just delete the 
copy off the flash stick which isn’t perfect but it’s quicker, easi-
er than having to follow the policy.” 
Individuals would then have to find other, lower-impact, ways 
to proceed with their primary tasks.  For instance, problems in 
the VPN connections led to 12 participants maintaining local 
versions of active files: 
P111: “At times we do have to transfer the data to our laptops 
because the network is slow, response times can be really bad 
and some of the files are quite large so we transfer them to our 
laptops to work on and then transfer them back at the end of 
the day.” 
The slow or unresponsive nature of IT support had the same 
effect. Thirty-eight participants reported that they are at times 
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forced to derive their own security solutions, due to slow re-
sponse from IT support, and the processes for configuring se-
cured access to systems proving slow.  A demonstrative exam-
ple mentioned by 13 participants involved employees using the 
system accounts of other employees to afford access to infor-
mation, due to the need for immediate access and slow access 
control setup processes: 
P91: “That does happen sometimes. It’s just partly to fill a gap 
in IS, you know - because we use lots of systems here, and they 
take ages to set up, and sometimes when someone joins a team, 
[…] he actually only obtained access to the systems about four 
months later, when he was going to leave, so in the interim 
time, he was sort of using other people’s logins.”   
2) Lack of Adaptability: A lack of adaptability in the 
organizational IT systems to account for changing 
organizational conditions also caused disruption problems.  In 
many cases employees did not have timely access to 
information necessary for their role, and so had to derive ad-
hoc solutions when a problem arose (28 participants):  
P97: “There has been an instance where I have, I was off for a 
month earlier this year and because of the resolutions were 
coming through and no-one had an idea what these resolutions 
or this packs were not being resolved so I gave it to one of my 
colleagues for him to go to my e-mail to check for the resolu-
tions and that’s been the only instance I think.”  
3) Increased Cognitive Load: Employees also needed to 
devise their own security mechanisms when the organisation's 
password policies produced excessive cognitive load.  Thirty-
seven participants reported that they felt necessary to 
physically write down the passwords for system accounts that 
they rarely used (and as such could not readily recall), then 
applying security principles to take some action to protect the 
physical artefact recording the password(s): 
P58: “I have got a list of passwords written down somewhere 
unfortunately.  I just find there’s too many to remember other-
wise, and we’ve got a different username and password most of 
the time for each of each of the logins, so it’s written down on 
a bit of paper.” 
4) Disruption: In other cases, security restrictions led to 
disruption of employee tasks; fifty-three participants 
mentioned that they found themselves in situations wherein 
security mechanisms were blocking their primary task:  
P101: “Sometimes it can be quite frustrating because you are 
genuinely waiting for work documents to come in from external 
sources, and where our security’s so tight, some of the docu-
ments that we’re waiting for can’t get into us, so sometimes 
that can be a hindrance as well.” 
In response to this type of situation, 43 employees reported that 
they had to resort to other non-prescribed practices: 
P2: “The first trick that was taught to me was you tell them to 
send it as a different type of file. Change the extension so you 
can get the file so that you can get your work done” 
Another employee reported he carried two laptops with them, 
as access restrictions did not permit all of the tasks he needed 
to complete to be carried out on the same machine:  
P88: “I've got two company computers, one laptop unlocked 
which allows me virtual areas so that I can install software and 
use it for technical reasons.  And I've got my day to day laptop 
which is going to be locked up again.” 
The findings in this section indicate that shadow security 
behavior was caused by security either imposing a prohibitive 
personal cost, or simply not fitting to the primary task.  The 
alternative security solutions and circumventions derived by 
employees were driven by their focus on business process. 
C. Security Mediation at Team Level 
The way security is managed in the organization also con-
tributed to shadow security practices.  Managers are directly 
responsible for managing many security functions within their 
teams: they take access control decisions, provide security 
decision support and prescribe behaviors to team members.  
Sixty-two participants reported that there is a lack of adequate 
communication about security from the organization, and 57 
said security messages are internalized at team level through 
discussion with their manager or colleagues: 
P14: “One gentleman that works in my group gave us a whole 
workshop at one of our team meetings, on how to create secure 
passwords.  Not to use your pet’s name and your birthday, you 
know, simple things that people could figure out, like your 
phone number.”  
P96: “Well basically we were introduced to the security policy 
through my team leader.  He outlined and gave us a site tour of 
what we can and cannot do.”…“(in team talks we discuss)…if 
we have encountered what we could identify as a security mo-
ment it could be like you know a door being left open or your 
computer left being switched on or not been locked or any 
sensitive information lying on your desk, to be mindful of put-
ting away security information also using a flash drive which 
are not company issued and stuff like that really.”  
Eighteen participants also reported that their managers provide 
additional support when they require advice on the sharing of 
information, both internally within the organization and exter-
nally when there’s a need to share documents with external 
partners: 
P108: “…I have got my immediate manager that helps me un-
derstand what I need to do and what needs to go out and not.” 
P29: “I know from my point of view being an analyst.  If I were 
to ever share any information with any priority, even if I was 
not sure I would first go to my manager and ask him about it.”    
In addition to communication, 29 employees reported that their 
managers are responsible for access control (authorizing em-
ployee access to data) and information management: 
P79: “the manager of each team is responsible for allocating 
permissions”  
Despite their key role in managing security within their teams, 
the three managers participating in the study reported that they 
have had no security training: 
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“I: Are you responsible for their security awareness in any 
sense?” “P98: That’s an interesting point. That’s not something 
that has ever been particularly made clear to me. I suspect I 
would take that on board as a normal encompassing responsi-
bility with regards to having people at work for me doing the 
right thing but I don’t recall any specific guideline”  
One manager explicitly reported that the behaviors they pre-
scribe are their personal beliefs (not company directives):  
P36: “You know, because my responsibility is financial, pro-
tecting the, the financial data. I, I take it upon myself to make 
sure that we’re staying abreast of what is appropriate, what's 
not appropriate.  What some of the new requirements may be 
as they’re released. Not that I'm aware of.”  
The findings in this section show that the communication, 
deployment and evolution of security behavior within organi-
zational sub-divisions mostly relies on managers as a conduit.  
But the organization did not provide adequate support or train-
ing to them, which invites the evolution of local, ad-hoc prac-
tices, which may divert from the organization's policy.  The 
absence of a consistent security position encourages independ-
ent action on managing security at team level; shadow security 
is seen to be implicitly permitted by the organization and ex-
plicitly by the team manager. The result are ad-hoc practices 
(P118: “not policy, my own best practice”).  This results in 
inconsistent communication, knowledge and interpretation, in 
effect fostering many differing security behaviors within the 
same organization.   
D. Employee Feedback Goes Unnoticed 
In many ways, perceptions of the organization's existing 
security implementations, as elicited from employees, indicate 
where they believe the organization has failed to provide them 
with adequate security support or indeed failed to keep the 
organization secure.  Housekeeping around access control, for 
example, was not seen by employees as being managed proper-
ly and 19 participants expressed concerns to that effect: 
P109: “There is five or six people that have since left the busi-
ness or, have gone elsewhere in the business but that they have 
the password.” 
Despite some employees taking action and reporting perceived 
security problems, 8 participants reported that to them it seems 
that their reported concerns go unnoticed:  
P53: “I’ve raised security issues and you never get anywhere 
with them.  I raised the issue of memory sticks, I also raised an 
issue where I had a contractor came to work for the company 
and he was given a laptop.  And it belonged, it had belonged 
clearly to one of the directors and it had all his information 
still on it. [..] You were still made to do it and you could, sort 
of, flag your reservations up but they wouldn’t be listened to”, 
and 13 others reported that they saw no attempts to improve the 
current organizational security implementation: 
“I: So, which way would you say the culture is moving? Is it 
that, security is getting tighter, or it is weakening?”, P110: “To 
be honest from day to day things, I do not really see it moving 
to be honest.” 
There appears to be a general perception amongst employ-
ees that the organization demands security but does not listen 
to feedback, and does not respond in an adequate or timely 
manner when shortcomings are identified.  This validates em-
ployees who adapt security in their own way when an alterna-
tive solution is needed. 
VI. THE EMERGENCE OF SHADOW SECURITY 
The shadow security practices we identified represent the 
sum of self-made security measures created by productivity-
focused employees when the organization's existing security 
implementation does not meet their needs.  Rather than remain-
ing passive, employees, peer groups, and managers who have 
their own understanding of security, individually or collective-
ly devise their own adaptations to unsatisfactory security 
measures or introduce their own novel solutions.  These are 
perceived by employees as serving the purpose of maintaining 
security.  Isolated from the security division, the alternative 
solutions deployed are based on their own understanding of 
what the security experience should be like.  But often, shadow 
security practices do not manage the organization’s risks ade-
quately.   
Security communication emerges as dysfunctional; there is 
limited awareness of the existence of security policies and 
formal procedures.  Employees are willing to report problems 
and suggest better solutions, but there is no effective feedback 
channel for this purpose. In reality, key stakeholders in the 
organization (line managers, for instance) are complicit in the 
development of shadow security, primarily because these prac-
tices moderate the negative impact of security on productivity: 
like their employees, they value productivity more. Security 
measures that reduce productivity cause disgruntlement: indi-
viduals refuse to accept the interference with their primary 
task, on which they are ultimately judged. They accept the 
need for security, but security that does not fit forces them to 
develop their own solutions.   Without security management 
actively soliciting feedback from employees to identify securi-
ty-productivity friction points and subsequent employee re-
sponses, the security of the organization becomes that which 
managers and employees - assumed non-experts in security - 
consider to provide the best fit for their business processes. 
VII. RISKS TO THE ORGANIZATION 
Whilst it is understandable that employees resort to a “Do It 
Yourself” approach to security, turning a blind eye harbors a 
number of potential risks for the organization: 
 It creates a false sense of security: employees believe they 
are protecting the organization, but their understanding of 
the risks the organization faces can be incomplete or inac-
curate (e.g. “I delete data from unencrypted USB drive”).  
As a result they develop their own rationalizations of how 
to manage security.  This approach can potentially be ef-
fective if employees are significantly aware about security 
related risks or happen to choose actions that protect the 
organization, but any security management approach 
based on ad-hoc solutions devised in isolation by employ-
ees may fail to reflect the actual risks the organization fac-
es: employees cannot be assumed to be security experts. 
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 In some cases, procured solutions force employees to re-
shape their primary task to adapt to badly designed securi-
ty (e.g. “I carry two laptops”), instead of security adapting 
to the task. This can quickly exhaust the employee’s com-
pliance budget [2]: in a situation where the perceived cost 
is too high (e.g. a need to travel regularly with two com-
puters instead of one), employees' response may be inse-
cure (e.g. travel with the one laptop that has the widest 
possible access and perform all tasks on it [29]). 
 Ineffective communication of policy to managers - those 
best-placed to convey behaviors to employees - can lead to 
the development of varying security “micro-cultures” in 
smaller teams.  Without appropriate training, managers 
cannot be assumed to be sufficiently aware of the policy 
and also lack an overview of the security risks that exist 
within the organization.  As a result, managers can only 
communicate to employees what they themselves believe 
is important about security at the time and, like employees, 
they cannot be assumed to be security experts.  This can 
result in divergent behaviors developing, out of the organ-
ization’s control, rendering the organization vulnerable to 
insecure employee behaviors that can become common 
practice.  
 The divergence of behavior across different teams pro-
vides freedom for the development of team security folk 
models [30], which are reinforced by both team managers 
and team members.  This can act as an additional level of 
resistance to attempts by the organization to change em-
ployee behaviors and account for divergence from pre-
scribed behaviors or current mechanisms when a good rea-
son for it exists.  
 "Hard" technical solutions that the organization refuses to 
change or replace may prevent shadow security practices 
from developing, but cause disgruntlement. This can lead 
to further alienation of users, adding to any existing user-
security divide [20], and compounding resistance to cen-
trally-dictated expectations.  The identified lack of a re-
sponse from security to reported employee security con-
cerns (as in Section V.D., P53) can accentuate this divide: 
if employees resort to shadow security practices, this may 
indirectly serve to reduce their frustration with security.  
VIII. LESSONS FROM SHADOW SECURITY 
While shadow security practices persist, the organization 
has an inconsistent security posture which does not align with 
its productivity goals. However, the existence of shadow secu-
rity also suggests the presence of a latent capacity for users to 
appreciate and play an active part in the provision of security, 
albeit driven by their internalized sense of what security should 
achieve for the primary task.  Employees deploy their own 
security solutions when they believe a required “affordable” 
policy or infrastructure is missing, instead of doing nothing or 
passively relying on the organization to remediate. Security 
experts should be aware of this individual capacity and the 
potential for employees to consciously consider security in 
their activities.  Shadow security can inspire more workable 
security implementations that align with productivity objec-
tives, provide effective protection, and minimize security over-
head. 
In the remainder of this section we discuss four specific as-
pects of the organization and its approach to security, where 
the identified shadow security practices can be used as a lever-
age for improvements: (a) Reduction of the complexity of 
mechanisms and processes required for compliant behaviors, 
(b) Engagement with users in rationalizing the current security 
implementation, (c) Attention to the assessment of the suitabil-
ity of proposed security solutions, and (d) Training and partici-
pation of managers in guiding security decisions.  These areas 
are related closely to the experiences of individuals within the 
partner organization, and specifically examples where signifi-
cant friction between security and the primary task led to the 
development of activities that can be characterized as shadow 
security. 
A. Reducing Compliance Costs 
We learnt 15 years ago that organizations with unusable se-
curity mechanisms are not effectively protected, because error 
and workarounds create vulnerabilities [7].  We have since 
learnt that a high level of non-compliance creates noise in 
which signs of attacks are hard to detect [2], and people just 
ignore security advice that requires high effort for little benefit 
[3].  But our results show there has been little progress in iden-
tifying and removing ‘ill-fitting’ security policies and mecha-
nisms: organizations still do not track the effort that individuals 
have to expend on security.  Burdensome or disruptive security 
implementations promote shadow security - users create their 
own workable security solutions.    Security experts need to 
acknowledge that effective security can only be achieved by if 
it fits and supports, rather than hinders, productive activity.  
The increasing decentralization of modern IT implementations 
means that security challenges need to be solved in a decentral-
ized, cooperative way [31].  This requires a move away from 
‘standard’ and ‘best practice’ solutions for managing a security 
risk, to a participative approach that works with users to under-
stand where and how security can fit in the productive activity 
that users are focused on. 
B. Engagement of Users in Security Design and Effectiveness 
Assessment 
The capacity of users to participate in security can provide 
leverage to create new, seamless security solutions that are 
better aligned with their primary tasks.  As previously dis-
cussed, users do not dismiss security, but act concoct "more 
appropriate" security solutions when they encounter unworka-
ble security.  Employees rationalize their experience with secu-
rity, and these rationalizations may not necessarily be those 
that the security experts expect [32]; but these rationalizations 
dictate how individuals interact with IT security, and the value 
they see in compliance.   Stochastic models have shown that 
more effective security solutions can at times be counterintui-
tive to entrenched wisdom [14][33].  Organizations may 
choose to accept that employee responses happen naturally. In 
this way, (i) employees are the first indicator if security solu-
tions are not serving the business, and (ii) security management 
must determine a strategy for engagement with security needs 
and the associated two-way dialogue with users. Security 
should not indirectly promote shadow security simply through 
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lack of proper channels for remediation.  Where shadow secu-
rity practices occur, contributory factors can and should be 
analyzed and leveraged to improve organizational security. 
To reduce the likelihood of shadow security developing in 
the first place, users can be involved in security design as an 
integral part of the process.  The importance of involving users 
in systems design was first identified by Checkland et al. [34], 
and the value of participatory and contextual design is widely 
accepted among developers.  But this approach is still not 
adopted in security, with a few exceptions [32] in the formula-
tion of authorization policies.  A participatory security design 
approach includes representation of users' tasks – and this 
knowledge can be used to find a low-friction solution that does 
not compete for users’ attention or effort, disrupts productivity 
activity, or leads to errors.  It also helps to identify security 
goals and values [35] – as this study shows, employees do try 
and protect organizational assets against risks they understand.  
Many security experts still talk (and think) that usability and 
security create a tradeoff: that usability is nice, but security is 
important, so it's ok to ask users to make extra effort.  But usa-
bility is a hygiene factor for security: solutions that are not 
usable will not work as intended, period.  At worst, users will 
become disgruntled and see security as obstacles to scoot 
around. At best, security-conscious users will create a shadow 
security solution that is workable as far as they are concerned, 
but may not manage organization risks effectively.  Our partic-
ipants openly discussed how security problems interrupt their 
workflow, and what coping mechanisms they developed as a 
response. They were also able to articulate ways for the organi-
zation to improve (e.g. Section V.D., P53, P109).  All this con-
stitutes valid and useful feedback (even without recognizing 
employees as security experts), which could be repurposed to 
improve the organization's security posture [31].    
C. Deploy, then Measure 
Organizations need to measure the impact of security on 
employees and productive activity, and keep monitoring it.  
Currently there is no post-deployment assessment of the impact 
of deployed security mechanisms on business processes; a lack 
of complaints may be seen as proof that everything is well, but, 
as the manifestation of shadow security reveals, silence does 
not mean security is working as the organization has specified.  
Regular assessment of the suitability of systems would turn 
security management into an iterative process, moving away 
from a static, “fire and forget”2 approach.  For example, the 
introduction of a new business system that requires password 
authentication adds one more credential to the cognitive load 
placed upon users (Section V.B. P58); this strains their capaci-
ty to both recall individual passwords (encouraging use of 
recall aids) and generate truly unique credentials for individual 
systems (making re-use of existing passwords an increasingly 
attractive solution) [27] – user reaction to such a process can 
only be accurately assessed after deployment. 
D. Management Training – Recognise the Importance of Low- 
and Middle-Management in Security 
Security is a collective achievement [36] and managers are 
participating in it in many ways: employees turn to them for 
                                                          
2 Military term for missiles that require no further guidance after launch 
support regarding their security decisions; they make local - 
and potentially ad-hoc - decisions about access control and 
information sharing, and they prescribe and moderate security 
behavior amongst their team members, thus contributing to the 
evolution of shadow security practices.  Security awareness 
and behavior amongst managers is thus important: employees 
listen to and follow their managers’ behavior [37].  Security 
management needs to understand that any security awareness 
or education they broadcast will be interpreted and mediated 
locally.  They need to be aware of this, and (1) listen to manag-
ers’ questions, problems and concerns, and (2) help them to 
develop correct and consistent security advice about security.  
If organizations neglect to do so, managers and their teams will 
continue to create their own rationalizations as to what their 
interactions with IT-security mean, and how to achieve their 
ultimate goal: to proceed with their primary tasks with minimal 
damage on the organization’s security. Security-specific train-
ing should be tailored for managers to acknowledge their role 
as mediators of security - instead of being overloaded with 
security knowledge, training for managers can consider organi-
zational goals and organizational security principles.  In this 
way, when individuals consult their managers, they are more 
likely to design novel solutions that account for the risks faced 
by members of the team.  In addition, managers of small teams 
interact much more frequently with employees and have a 
unique perspective of the frictions between security and 
productivity tasks; soliciting feedback from them can contrib-
ute to an effective amalgamation of shadow and prescribed 
security practices.   
IX. CONCLUSION  
User reaction to an organization’s security implementation 
needs to be heard, lest it weaken the organization's security 
posture: learning from, and not ignoring, employees can en-
hance security, aligning it with organizational goals and in-
creasing its effectiveness.  If users are not heard, they can be-
come disenfranchised, and should they have a legitimate con-
cern about security, they will not remain passive in the face of 
ill-fitting solutions - they will engineer their own shadow secu-
rity environment.  Organizations must be able to recognize 
when and where shadow security is created, its causes, and in 
turn how to adapt security provisions to respond to user needs - 
without a consistent means of engagement with users, security 
enforcers cannot claim absolute certainty that the security in-
frastructure exists exactly as intended.  We propose that securi-
ty managers can learn from shadow security in a number of 
ways: simplifying compliance with security, measuring the 
effectiveness of security mechanisms after deployment, engag-
ing users when designing security solutions, and leveraging the 
position of team managers as both a mediator for security and a 
conduit for feedback as to the appropriateness of security solu-
tions in supporting productive tasks.  Essentially, shadow secu-
rity should be treated as an opportunity to identify shortfalls in 
current security implementations and their effects on the organ-
izational environment, to be leveraged in providing more effec-
tive security solutions for organizations. 
X. FUTURE WORK 
The identification of shadow security creates a number of 
future research challenges. To determine if shadow security 
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practices can be leveraged within a holistic security manage-
ment process, we are currently conducting similar analyses on 
additional sets of interviews from two further organizations, 
and are negotiating deployment of solutions - informed by 
identified shadow security behaviors - within partner organiza-
tions.  This will allow deployment of security solutions in-
formed by shadow security behaviors and assessment of their 
real-world effectiveness.   
We also agreed with a partner organization to conduct fur-
ther interviews and in-depth analyses studying the rationale of 
employees engaging in shadow security behaviors: in many 
cases employees admitted to knowing that their practices were 
compromising security, so there is a need to determine if and 
how they assess the risks created by their behaviors before 
following a course of action (e.g. P49 on use of unencrypted 
USB sticks, was the participant aware that simply "deleting" 
unencrypted files does not stop an attacker from recovering 
them from the flash drive?).  We also aim to examine the com-
patibility of shadow security- driven information security man-
agement with current regulatory frameworks and international 
standards with which modern organizations need to comply.  
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